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CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, AND 
INDIGENOUS, by James A.R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood 
Paterson & Alison Dundes Renteln 1
ASHA KAUSHAL 2
CULTURAL LAW: International, Comparative, and Indigenous (Cultural Law) is a 
treatise that explores the relationships between culture and law. It is a pioneering 
and remarkable contribution to a burgeoning fi eld. While there have been books 
about law and culture generally,3 as well as books about the specifi c contexts in 
which law and culture intersect, this is the fi rst book to tie these elements 
together in a comprehensive volume.
Designed as a course text and reference work, the book begins with some 
of cultural law’s articulations, moves on to defi nitional terms and debates, and 
then turns to culture and law in specifi c contexts. It is fi lled with case excerpts, 
scholarship, and media articles alongside authorial commentary and discussion 
questions. Th is terrain is vast—and there is no necessary complementarity 
between the specifi c contexts of culture and law—so it is not surprising that the 
book is hefty in both volume and content.
Th is review provides an overview of the book’s content, as well as an analysis 
of its approach and orientation. In so doing, it seeks to position this text against 
the broader background of law’s fraught relationship with culture. It proceeds 
in three Parts. First, the review highlights the contribution this text makes to 
the fi eld. Second, it parses the organization and content of the book. Th ird, it 
1. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1040 pages.
2. LL.B. (Osgoode), M.Sc. (London School of Economics), LL.M. (Harvard); Ph.D. candidate 
at the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law.
3. See e.g. Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Deventer: WEJ Tjeenk Willink, 
1999); Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Th eory 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).
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explores dimensions of the relationship between law and culture that were not 
included in the book and suggests why these exclusions might matter.
I. THE EMERGENT FIELD OF CULTURAL LAW
From a purely functional perspective, Cultural Law fi lls a void and suggests a fi eld 
of study in one fell swoop; for the fi rst time, the disparate domains of culture and 
law appear under one cover. Given the breadth and depth of the subject matter, 
the authors have done an impressive job of distilling fi elds of law and swaths of 
literature into manageable excerpts and commentaries. Th eir method permits 
the book many possible uses: as an introduction to culture and/or law, as a 
reference text for a specifi c context, as a course book, and as a starting text for 
further research.
Th e authors are well-recognized academics who work under the umbrella 
of cultural law. James A.R. Nafziger is a professor of law who works in the fi elds 
of international law, sports law, and cultural heritage law. Robert Kirkwood 
Paterson is a professor of law who works in the fi elds of international trade and 
investment law, as well as cultural heritage and art law. Alison Dundes Renteln is 
a professor of political science and anthropology who works in the fi elds of law 
and cultural rights. Th e specifi c contexts in the book loosely mirror these fi elds of 
interest, with perhaps the exceptions of religion and language. Th e authors share 
an abiding interest in international law, which is visible throughout.
From a theoretical perspective, the book makes a signifi cant contribution 
by reclaiming the fi eld of culture for law. It comes on the heels of the momentum 
generated by scholarship in various disciplines proclaiming a world “beyond 
culture,”4 a world of “radical hybridity,”5 and a cosmopolitan world of “pluralism 
internalized.”6 Th is book expresses the continued existence and relevance of 
culture in the world. It refuses the hand of the postmodern iconoclast and turns 
instead to case law to demonstrate the persistent role that culture plays in legal 
disputes of all sorts. Th e chapters on specifi c contexts confi rm the endurance of 
culture as an organizing category.
4. Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of 
Diff erence” (1992) 7:1 Cult Anthro 6 at 6. 
5. See e.g. Seyla Benhabib, Th e Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) at 25; Homi Bhabha, Th e Location of Culture 
(Oxon: Routledge, 1994).
6. Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative” (1992) 25:3&4 
Mich JL Reform 751 at 754.
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Th e corresponding theoretical inquiry, however, must be the nature of the 
reclamation itself. Th ere is a two-part question lurking in the background: Is the 
fi eld of cultural law suffi  ciently unitary to study in this way; and, then, should 
these phenomena be categorized as part of this same fi eld? It is possible, in the 
legal register, that cultural heritage and sports have little to do with religion and 
language; they are certainly not regulated by similar laws. Th is is ultimately an 
issue of categorization, and it will fall to each reader to decide.
II. ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT
Th e authors set out their subject matter clearly, beginning with introductory 
concepts and settings before turning to specifi c contexts. A reader who engages 
with the text in order, from beginning to end, will fi nd that the chapter content 
fl ows logically. Th e fi rst two chapters provide an overview of concepts and defi nitions 
and off er a proposed framework for thinking about cultural law.
Chapter one is intended to show culture in diff erent contexts. It opens with 
the Yahoo! Inc v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme case, which pitted 
a French law prohibiting the exhibition and sale of Nazi materials against the US 
Constitution’s First Amendment protection for free speech.7 Th is case places culture, 
understood as a national, historically-contingent posture towards speech, in the 
legal forum. Chapter one then takes the reader through different cultural 
orientations towards dispute resolution, business transactions, and diplomacy. 
Th e readings in chapter one, coming at the beginning of the book, seem somewhat 
superfl uous. If the aim is to show culture in various contexts, then it is diffi  cult 
to reconcile these settings with the specifi c contexts explored in the following 
chapters. Moreover, because these excerpts contain discussions about the 
“non-litigious nature of the Japanese”8 or “fi ve … Korean cultural values,”9 they 
seem to trade on essentialized understandings of groups.
Th e second chapter is a deft evolutionary march through the defi nitional 
terms and disciplinary debates of each fi eld. It situates the term “culture” through 
the entertaining and helpful debate that Clyde Kluckhohn and William H. Kelly 
present in “Th e Concept of Culture.”10 Th e chapter then traces the evolution of 
the concept of culture from E.B. Taylor through to Cliff ord Geertz, providing solid 
7. 169 F Supp (2d) 1181, 30 Media L Rep 1001 (ND Cal 2001); supra note 1 at 1.
8. Ibid at 11.
9. Ibid at 14.
10. In Ralph Linton, ed, Th e Science of Man in the World Crisis (New York: Octagon Press, 1980) 
78; supra note 1 at 100.
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grounding in various anthropological theories of culture. When the chapter turns 
to law, the treatment is equally thorough. Th e authors sketch the jurisprudential 
debates between legal positivism and natural law, and beyond.11 Th e Hart-Full-
er debate12 is positioned alongside the cases of East German border guards who 
had killed individuals attempting to fl ee the country, in accordance with national 
law, but who were later prosecuted for their actions in the European Court of 
Human Rights.13 Th e chapter then skilfully introduces entire disciplinary sub-
specialities, including international law, comparative law, and Indigenous law.
Chapters three through ten provide a series of case studies of cultural law. 
Th e fi rst three of these chapters examine the area of cultural heritage law. Th ese 
chapters cover everything from theft of cultural materials to art forgery to artistic 
moral rights. A theme that emerges here is the contested ownership of cultural 
things. From the Indiana art dealer’s Byzantine relic, to the Hindu labourer’s 
discovery of the Pathur Nataraja, to the salvage rights in the Titanic, the issues of 
“whose culture” and “whose object” are prominent. Chapter six is about intangible 
cultural heritage, which is distinguished from traditional knowledge. It explores 
the diff erent ways they interact with law, including intellectual property rights 
and Aboriginal custom.14 Chapter seven focuses on museums as repositories of 
cultural heritage and as institutions that are in dialogue with society.15
Chapter eight moves beyond cultural heritage to examine the nature and law 
of sports. It explores the consequences of institutionalization and commercialization 
and includes cases about contested doping results, participatory discrimination, 
and sport as a cultural exception in the European Union.16 Chapter nine 
addresses religion, primarily in the global context. It considers religion in the 
public sphere generally and off ers readings about religious dress from diff erent 
jurisdictions.17 This chapter could have usefully spent time exploring the 
relationship between religion and culture. Religion is an increasingly salient feature 
of cultural diversity, yet contemporary scholarship frequently confl ates the two 
11. Ibid at 123-32. 
12. HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71:4 Harv L Rev 593; 
Lon L Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71:4 Harv 
L Rev 630.
13. Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany (2001), 40:4 ILM 811, 33 EHRR 751; K-HW v 
Germany (2001), 40:4 ILM 773, 36 EHRR 1081; supra note 1 at 134.
14. Ibid at 614.
15. Ibid at 674.
16. Ibid at 740.
17. Ibid at 831.
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domains.18 Finally, chapter ten describes the relationship between language and 
culture.19 Th e concepts and debates from the fi rst two chapters gain some traction 
here as the reader considers the place of language in discussions about identity 
and nationalism. Th ese readings consider the Nigerian gradualist approach 
toward linguistic unifi cation, French commercial signage in Québec, and foreign 
accent discrimination in the United States. 
Th is summary of the chapters raises the categorization issue again. Are 
museums sites of cultural law that are helpfully separated from cultural heritage 
and art law? Should religion and language be considered contexts of cultural law, 
or are they better thought of as inherent aspects and manifestations of culture? 
Nonetheless, the case studies are organized and comprehensive; they cover the 
principal sources of law in each area and off er thoughtful discussion.
III. LAW’S CULTURE AND CULTURE’S LAW
In this Part, the review addresses two related perspectives on law and culture 
that are not explored in the book. Th e fi rst chapter of Cultural Law introduces a 
framework that encompasses these perspectives, and the authors are clear that it 
is intended as the beginning of a conversation, not a fi nal framework for cultural 
law. Th ey propose a set of relationships between law and culture:
1. Law embodies culture and formalizes its norms.
2. Law promotes, protects, conditions, and limits cultural attributes 
and expressions.
3. Law harmonizes cross-cultural diff erences, confi rms cultural 
rights, and establishes international standards.
4. Culture reinforces legal rules.
5. Culture conditions and constrains the adoption, interpretation, 
and vitality of legal rules.
6. Cultural expressions and symbols promote legal relationships.20
Th e fi rst perspective asks how the “law and culture” project might change if we 
accept that culture and law are mutually constitutive. Th e six-part framework 
incorporates this proposition in its twin notions that law embodies culture 
18. Will Kymlicka, “Th e Th ree Lives of Multiculturalism” (UBC-Laurier Institution 
Multicultural Lecture, delivered at Th e Chan Centre for the Performing Arts at UBC, 15 
April 2008), [unpubli shed].
19. Supra note 1 at 915.
20. Ibid at 64.
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(relationship #1) and that culture reinforces legal rules (relationship #4). 
However, the framework does not quite permeate the rest of the book. Th is has 
two consequences. First, the case studies do not always explore the boundaries of 
each category or address the possibility that the fl uid nature of culture might render 
law’s application diffi  cult or inappropriate in certain instances. Second, the rich 
theoretical debates about the nature of the relationship between culture and law 
do not appear in the book, and the historical debt that cultural law owes to legal 
realism and to the law and society movement, among others, is left unexplored. 
Th e mutually constitutive relationship between law and culture has two 
elements. Law is steeped in culture; its concepts and reasoning styles are in-
herently cultural.21 Th is is law as culture. In this sense, law both contains and 
produces culture. Th is is what Benjamin Berger means when he describes law as a 
cultural form; law is not neutral or culture-less but rather constrained by its own “in-
forming commitments.”22 It is equally true that culture carries the regulative force 
of law for its adherents. Th is applies particularly in the religious context, where 
religious norms govern commercial and family matters, sometimes in tribunals that 
operate alongside those of the state. Th is is culture as law. Jeremy Waldron puts 
it this way: “[T]he cultural side presents itself in some sense as law for those who 
live by it.”23
Th ere is no doubt that a course book—by its very nature, a comprehensive 
and introductory text—cannot touch upon every subject in depth. Nor would it 
be fair to require everything to do with culture and law to be in one book. It is 
simply that the reader is left with the persistent sense that the book glosses over 
the signifi cance of this fi eld of scholarship. Most importantly, the book could 
do a better job exploring the implications of the broad and deep application 
of law to cultural/cultured individuals and groups. If law presupposes certain 
cultural understandings and equipment, and culture contains regulatory norms 
of its own, to whom should the law apply and in what circumstances? Is it fair 
to apply the same law to two individuals who understand both the law and their 
own behaviours diff erently? Th is is the concern animating the cultural defense 
in criminal law, explored in chapter one, and it is the question at the heart of 
cultural law: What does the coexistence of culture and law mean for each of them 
at a foundational level? 
21. Rosen, supra note 3 at 5. 
22. Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 277.
23. Jeremy Waldron, “One Law for All? Th e Logic of Cultural Accommodation” (2002) 59:1 
Wash & Lee L Rev 3 at 17.
BOOK REVIEWS 477
Th e book’s second shortcoming relates to culture in society. Culture is fun-
damentally about identity. By providing the reader with a concrete concept of 
culture and focusing on legal disputes and texts, the book overlooks the scholarship 
on culture as identity and its signifi cance for law. Th is scholarship focuses on 
ascriptive groups and rights within the liberal democratic state. It begins from 
the primordial debate about how to understand the self—as situated or 
unencumbered—and then considers what we need to make a good life, how we 
develop our identities, and why our identities matter.24 
Th is political philosophy literature on recognition, diff erence, and multicultural 
citizenship shares the common premise that individuals are often also members 
of identity groups. Th ese identity groups may categorize individuals based on 
their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or culture.25 Th ese categories are generally 
understood to mark the collective dimension of people’s identities. Th e role of 
the state in acknowledging these identities is at the core of this scholarship. Th is 
role merges into law when it turns to the theoretical and policy prescriptions 
required to realize and to preserve our individually and collectively identifi ed 
selves. Th e prescriptions that follow include several types of cultural measures, 
most of which are located in law and certainly engage law in foundational ways.26 
Th e book comes close to contemplating how culture as identity matters for 
law when it enters the sphere of culture in courtroom settings, and it comes even 
closer in the chapters on religion and language. But the religion chapter, due 
to its primarily international perspective, does not squarely address religion and 
identity. Th e language chapter attends to this issue, directly asking how language 
shapes identity and tackling the complexities of multilingual accommodation, 
but it should not be the entirety of the discussion.  
IV. CONCLUSION
Th is book is a major contribution to the emergent fi eld of cultural law. It nimbly 
ties together previously disparate cultural domains and provides the reader with 
24. See Charles Taylor, “Th e Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 25; 
K Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social 
Reproduction” (Ibid at 149); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Th eory of 
Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 25; Joseph Raz, “Multiculturalism: A 
Liberal Perspective” in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 170. 
25. Taylor, supra note 24 at 65 (noting other possible categories, such as gender and sexuality).
26. Jacob T Levy,   (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 125. 
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the legal framework governing each of them. Th is alone makes it an invaluable 
resource tool for academics, practitioners, and students. In addition, the book 
makes an admirable eff ort to provide a framework for cultural law. Th e authors’ 
ability to see and synthesize this new fi eld marks the beginning of a much larger 
project. We should be grateful to them for pointing the way. 
